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Abstract
The non-indexed parts of the Internet (the
Darknet) have become a haven for both le-
gal and illegal anonymous activity. Given the
magnitude of these networks, scalably moni-
toring their activity necessarily relies on auto-
mated tools, and notably on NLP tools. How-
ever, little is known about what characteristics
texts communicated through the Darknet have,
and how well off-the-shelf NLP tools do on
this domain. This paper tackles this gap and
performs an in-depth investigation of the char-
acteristics of legal and illegal text in the Dark-
net, comparing it to a clear net website with
similar content as a control condition. Tak-
ing drug-related websites as a test case, we
find that texts for selling legal and illegal drugs
have several linguistic characteristics that dis-
tinguish them from one another, as well as
from the control condition, among them the
distribution of POS tags, and the coverage of
their named entities in Wikipedia.1
1 Introduction
The term “Darknet” refers to the subset of Inter-
net sites and pages that are not indexed by search
engines. The Darknet is often associated with the
“.onion” top-level domain, whose websites are re-
ferred to as “Onion sites”, and are reachable via
the Tor network anonymously.
Under the cloak of anonymity, the Darknet har-
bors much illegal activity (Moore and Rid, 2016).
Applying NLP tools to text from the Darknet is
thus important for effective law enforcement and
intelligence. However, little is known about the
characteristics of the language used in the Dark-
net, and specifically on what distinguishes text on
websites that conduct legal and illegal activity. In
∗ Equal contribution
1Our code can be found in https://github.com/
huji-nlp/cyber. Our data is available upon request.
fact, the only work we are aware of that classi-
fied Darknet texts into legal and illegal activity is
Avarikioti et al. (2018), but they too did not inves-
tigate in what ways these two classes differ.
This paper addresses this gap, and studies the
distinguishing features between legal and illegal
texts in Onion sites, taking sites that advertise
drugs as a test case. We compare our results
to a control condition of texts from eBay2 pages
that advertise products corresponding to drug key-
words.
We find a number of distinguishing features.
First, we confirm the results of Avarikioti et al.
(2018), that text from legal and illegal pages
(henceforth, legal and illegal texts) can be distin-
guished based on the identity of the content words
(bag-of-words) in about 90% accuracy over a bal-
anced sample. Second, we find that the distri-
bution of POS tags in the documents is a strong
cue for distinguishing between the classes (about
71% accuracy). This indicates that the two classes
are different in terms of their syntactic structure.
Third, we find that legal and illegal texts are
roughly as distinguishable from one another as le-
gal texts and eBay pages are (both in terms of their
words and their POS tags). The latter point sug-
gests that legal and illegal texts can be consid-
ered distinct domains, which explains why they
can be automatically classified, but also implies
that applying NLP tools to Darknet texts is likely
to face the obstacles of domain adaptation. Indeed,
we show that named entities in illegal pages are
covered less well by Wikipedia, i.e., Wikification
works less well on them. This suggests that for
high-performance text understanding, specialized
knowledge bases and tools may be needed for pro-
cessing texts from the Darknet. By experiment-
ing on a different domain in Tor (user-generated
2https://www.ebay.com
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content), we show that the legal/illegal distinction
generalizes across domains.
After discussing previous works in Section 2,
we detail the datasets used in Section 3. Differ-
ences in the vocabulary and named entities be-
tween the classes are analyzed in Section 4, before
the presentation of the classification experiments
(Section 5). Section 6 presents additional experi-
ments, which explore cross-domain classification.
We further analyze and discuss the findings in Sec-
tion 7.
2 Related Work
The detection of illegal activities on the Web is
sometimes derived from a more general topic clas-
sification. For example, Biryukov et al. (2014)
classified the content of Tor hidden services into
18 topical categories, only some of which corre-
late with illegal activity. Graczyk and Kinning-
ham (2015) combined unsupervised feature selec-
tion and an SVM classifier for the classification of
drug sales in an anonymous marketplace. While
these works classified Tor texts into classes, they
did not directly address the legal/illegal distinc-
tion.
Some works directly addressed a specific type
of illegality and a particular communication con-
text. Morris and Hirst (2012) used an SVM classi-
fier to identify sexual predators in chatting mes-
sage systems. The model includes both lexical
features, including emoticons, and behavioral fea-
tures that correspond to conversational patterns.
Another example is the detection of pedophile
activity in peer-to-peer networks (Latapy et al.,
2013), where a predefined list of keywords was
used to detect child-pornography queries. Besides
lexical features, we here consider other general
linguistic properties, such as syntactic structure.
Al Nabki et al. (2017) presented DUTA (Dark-
net Usage Text Addresses), the first publicly
available Darknet dataset, together with a man-
ual classification into topical categories and sub-
categories. For some of the categories, legal and
illegal activities are distinguished. However, the
automatic classification presented in their work fo-
cuses on the distinction between different classes
of illegal activity, without addressing the distinc-
tion between legal and illegal ones, which is the
subject of the present paper. Al Nabki et al. (2019)
extended the dataset to form DUTA-10K, which
we use here. Their results show that 20% of the
hidden services correspond to “suspicious” activ-
ities. The analysis was conducted using the text
classifier presented in Al Nabki et al. (2017) and
manual verification.
Recently, Avarikioti et al. (2018) presented an-
other topic classification of text from Tor together
with a first classification into legal and illegal
activities. The experiments were performed on
a newly crawled corpus obtained by recursive
search. The legal/illegal classification was done
using an SVM classifier in an active learning set-
ting with bag-of-words features. Legality was as-
sessed in a conservative way where illegality is
assigned if the purpose of the content is an obvi-
ously illegal action, even if the content might be
technically legal. They found that a linear kernel
worked best and reported an F1 score of 85% and
an accuracy of 89%. Using the dataset of Al Nabki
et al. (2019), and focusing on specific topical cate-
gories, we here confirm the importance of content
words in the classification, and explore the linguis-
tic dimensions supporting classification into legal
and illegal texts.
3 Datasets Used
Onion corpus. We experiment with data from
Darknet websites containing legal and illegal ac-
tivity, all from the DUTA-10K corpus (Al Nabki
et al., 2019). We selected the “drugs” sub-domain
as a test case, as it is a large domain in the corpus,
that has a “legal” and “illegal” sub-categories, and
where the distinction between them can be reliably
made. These websites advertise and sell drugs, of-
ten to international customers. While legal web-
sites often sell pharmaceuticals, illegal ones are
often related to substance abuse. These pages are
directed by sellers to their customers.
eBay corpus. As an additional dataset of sim-
ilar size and characteristics, but from a clear net
source, and of legal nature, we compiled a corpus
of eBay pages. eBay is one of the largest hosting
sites for retail sellers of various goods. Our cor-
pus contains 118 item descriptions, each consist-
ing of more than one sentence. Item descriptions
vary in price, item sold and seller. The descrip-
tions were selected by searching eBay for drug re-
lated terms,3 and selecting search patterns to avoid
over-repetition. For example, where many sell
the same product, only one example was added to
3Namely, marijuana, weed, grass and drug.
All Onion eBay Illegal Onion Legal Onion
all half 1 half 2 all half 1 half 2 all half 1 half 2 all half 1 half 2
all 0.23 0.25 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.33 0.39 0.41 0.35 0.41 0.42
All Onion half 1 0.23 0.43 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.37 0.33 0.50 0.40 0.36 0.52
half 2 0.25 0.43 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.39 0.50 0.35 0.39 0.51 0.35
all 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.23 0.25 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.66 0.67 0.67
eBay half 1 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.23 0.43 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.67 0.68
half 2 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.25 0.43 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.68 0.68
all 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.23 0.27 0.61 0.62 0.62
Illegal Onion half 1 0.39 0.33 0.50 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.23 0.45 0.62 0.63 0.62
half 2 0.41 0.50 0.35 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.27 0.45 0.62 0.63 0.63
all 0.35 0.40 0.39 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.26 0.26
Legal onion half 1 0.41 0.36 0.51 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.26 0.47
half 2 0.42 0.52 0.35 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.26 0.47
Table 1: Jensen-Shannon divergence between word distribution in all Onion drug sites, Legal and Illegal Onion
drug sites, and eBay sites. Each domain was also split in half for within-domain comparison.
the corpus. Search queries also included filtering
for price, so that each query resulted with differ-
ent items. Either because of advertisement strate-
gies or the geographical dispersion of the sellers,
the eBay corpus contains formal as well as infor-
mal language, and some item descriptions contain
abbreviations and slang. Importantly, eBay web-
sites are assumed to conduct legal activity—even
when discussing drug-related material, we find it
is never the sale of illegal drugs but rather mer-
chandise, tools, or otherwise related content.
Cleaning. As preprocessing for all experiments,
we apply some cleaning to the text of web pages
in our corpora. HTML markup is already removed
in the original datasets, but much non-linguistic
content remains, such as buttons, encryption keys,
metadata and URLs. We remove such text from
the web pages, and join paragraphs to single lines
(as newlines are sometimes present in the original
dataset for display purposes only). We then re-
move any duplicate paragraphs, where paragraphs
are considered identical if they share all but num-
bers (to avoid an over-representation of some re-
maining surrounding text from the websites, e.g.
“Showing all 9 results”).
4 Domain Differences
As pointed out by Plank (2011), there is no com-
mon ground as to what constitutes a domain. Do-
main differences are attributed in some works to
differences in vocabulary (Blitzer et al., 2006) and
in other works to differences in style, genre and
medium (McClosky, 2010). While here we adopt
an existing classification, based on the DUTA-10K
corpus, we show in which way and to what extent
it translates to distinct properties of the texts. This
question bears on the possibility of distinguish-
ing between legal and illegal drug-related websites
based on their text alone (i.e., without recourse to
additional information, such as meta-data or net-
work structure).
We examine two types of domain differences
between legal and illegal texts: vocabulary differ-
ences and named entities.
4.1 Vocabulary Differences
To quantify the domain differences between texts
from legal and illegal texts, we compute the fre-
quency distribution of words in the eBay corpus,
the legal and illegal drugs Onion corpora, and the
entire Onion drug section (All Onion). Since any
two sets of texts are bound to show some dispar-
ity between them, we compare the differences be-
tween domains to a control setting, where we ran-
domly split each examined corpus into two halves,
and compute the frequency distribution of each of
them. The inner consistency of each corpus, de-
fined as the similarity of distributions between the
two halves, serves as a reference point for the sim-
ilarity between domains. We refer to this measure
as “self-distance”.
Following Plank and van Noord (2011), we
compute the Jensen-Shannon divergence and Vari-
ational distance (also known as L1 or Manhattan)
as the comparison measures between the word fre-
quency histograms.
Table 1 presents our results. The self-distance
of the eBay, Legal Onion and Illegal Onion cor-
% Wikifiable
eBay 38.6± 2.00
Illegal Onion 32.5± 1.35
Legal Onion 50.8± 2.31
Table 2: Average percentage of wikifiable named enti-
ties in a website per domain, with standard error.
pora lies between 0.40 to 0.45 by the Jensen-
Shannon divergence, but the distance between
each pair is 0.60 to 0.65, with the three approxi-
mately forming an equilateral triangle in the space
of word distributions. Similar results are obtained
using Variational distance, and are omitted for
brevity.
These results suggest that rather than regarding
all drug-related Onion texts as one domain, with
legal and illegal texts as sub-domains, they should
be treated as distinct domains. Therefore, using
Onion data to characterize the differences between
illegal and legal linguistic attributes is sensible.
In fact, it is more sensible than comparing Ille-
gal Onion to eBay text, as there the legal/illegal
distinction may be confounded by the differences
between eBay and Onion data.
4.2 Differences in Named Entities
In order to analyze the difference in the distribu-
tion of named entities between the domains, we
used a Wikification technique (Bunescu and Pas¸ca,
2006), i.e., linking entities to their corresponding
article in Wikipedia.
Using spaCy’s4 named entity recognition, we
first extract all named entity mentions from all the
corpora.5 We then search for relevant Wikipedia
entries for each named entity using the DBpedia
Ontology API (Daiber et al., 2013). For each
domain we compute the total number of named
entities and the percentage with corresponding
Wikipedia articles.
The results were obtained by averaging the per-
centage of wikifiable named entities in each site
per domain. We also report the standard error for
each average. According to our results (Table 2),
the Wikification success ratios of eBay and Illegal
4https://spacy.io
5We use all named entity types provided by spaCy (and
not only “Product”) to get a broader perspective on the differ-
ences between the domains in terms of their named entities.
For example, the named entity “Peru” (of type “Geopolitical
Entity”) appears multiple times in Onion sites and is meant
to imply the quality of a drug.
Onion named entities is comparable and relatively
low. However, sites selling legal drugs on Onion
have a much higher Wikification percentage.
Presumably the named entities in Onion sites
selling legal drugs are more easily found in pub-
lic databases such as Wikipedia because they are
mainly well-known names for legal pharmaceu-
ticals. However, in both Illegal Onion and eBay
sites, the list of named entities includes many
slang terms for illicit drugs and paraphernalia.
These slang terms are usually not well known by
the general public, and are therefore less likely
to be covered by Wikipedia and similar public
databases.
In addition to the differences in Wikification
ratios between the domains, it seems spaCy had
trouble correctly identifying named entities in
both Onion and eBay sites, possibly due to the
common use of informal language and drug-
related jargon. Eyeballing the results, there were a
fair number of false positives (words and phrases
that were found by spaCy but were not actually
named entities), especially in Illegal Onion sites.
In particular, slang terms for drugs, as well as
abbreviated drug terms, for example “kush” or
“GBL”, were being falsely picked up by spaCy.6
To summarize, results suggest both that (1) le-
gal and illegal texts are different in terms of their
named entities and their coverage in Wikipedia, as
well as that (2) standard databases and standard
NLP tools for named entity recognition (and po-
tentially other text understanding tasks), require
considerable adaptation to be fully functional on
text related to illegal activity.
5 Classification Experiments
Here we detail our experiments in classifying text
from different legal and illegal domains using var-
ious methods, to find the most important linguistic
features distinguishing between the domains. An-
other goal of the classification task is to confirm
our finding that the domains are distinguishable.
Experimental setup. We split each subset
among {eBay, Legal Onion, Illegal Onion} into
training, validation and test. We select 456 train-
ing paragraphs, 57 validation paragraphs and 58
test paragraphs for each category (approximately
6We consider these to be false positives as they are names
of substances but not specific products, and hence not named
entities. See https://spacy.io/api/annotation#
section-named-entities
a 80%/10%/10% split), randomly downsampling
larger categories for an even division of labels.
Model. To classify paragraphs into categories,
we experiment with five classifiers:
• NB (Naive Bayes) classifier with binary bag-
of-words features, i.e., indicator feature for
each word. This simple classifier features fre-
quently in work on text classification in the
Darknet.
• SVM (support vector machine) classifier with
an RBF kernel, also with BoW features that
count the number of words of each type.
• BoE (bag-of-embeddings): each word is
represented with its 100-dimensional GloVe
vector (Pennington et al., 2014). BoEsum
(BoEaverage) sums (averages) the embed-
dings for all words in the paragraph to a
single vector, and applies a 100-dimensional
fully-connected layer with ReLU non-
linearity and dropout p = 0.2. The word
vectors are not updated during training.
Vectors for words not found in GloVe are set
randomly ∼ N (µGloVe, σ2GloVe).
• seq2vec: same as BoE, but instead of aver-
aging word vectors, we apply a single-layer
100-dimensional BiLSTM to the word vec-
tors, and take the concatenated final hidden
vectors from the forward and backward part
as the input to a fully-connected layer (same
hyper-parameters as above).
• attention: we replace the word representa-
tions with contextualized pre-trained repre-
sentations from ELMo (Peters et al., 2018).
We then apply a self-attentive classification
network (McCann et al., 2017) over the con-
textualized representations. This architecture
has proved very effective for classification in
recent work (Tutek and Šnajder, 2018; Shen
et al., 2018).
For the NB classifier we use BernoulliNB
from scikit-learn7 with α = 1, and
for the SVM classifier we use SVC, also
from scikit-learn, with γ = scale and
tolerance=10−5. We use the AllenNLP library8
(Gardner et al., 2018) to implement the neural net-
work classifiers.
7https://scikit-learn.org
8https://allennlp.org
Data manipulation. In order to isolate what fac-
tors contribute to the classifiers’ performance, we
experiment with four manipulations to the input
data (in training, validation and testing). Specifi-
cally, we examine the impact of variations in the
content words, function words and shallow syn-
tactic structure (represented through POS tags).
For this purpose, we consider content words as
words whose universal part-of-speech according
to spaCy is one of the following:
{ADJ, ADV, NOUN, PROPN, VERB, X, NUM}
and function words as all other words. The tested
manipulations are:
• Dropping all content words (drop cont.)
• Dropping all function words (drop func.)
• Replacing all content words with their uni-
versal part-of-speech (pos cont.)
• Replacing all function words with their uni-
versal part-of-speech (pos func.)
Results when applying these manipulations are
compared to the full condition, where all words are
available.
Settings. We experiment with two settings, clas-
sifying paragraphs from different domains:
• Training and testing on eBay pages vs. Legal
drug-related Onion pages, as a control exper-
iment to identify whether Onion pages differ
from clear net pages.
• Training and testing on Legal Onion vs. Ille-
gal Onion drugs-related pages, to identify the
difference in language between legal and ille-
gal activity on Onion drug-related websites.
5.1 Results
The accuracy scores for the different classifiers
and settings are reported in Table 3.
Legal Onion vs. eBay. This control experiment
shows that Legal Onion content is quite easily dis-
tinguishable from eBay content, as a Naive Bayes
bag-of-words classifier reaches 91.4% accuracy on
this classification. Moreover, replacing function
words by their parts of speech even improves per-
formance, suggesting that the content words are
the important factor in this classification. This is
drop drop pos pos
full cont. func cont. func
eBay vs. Legal Onion Drugs
NB 91.4 57.8 90.5 56.9 92.2
SVM 63.8 64.7 63.8 68.1 63.8
BoEsum 66.4 56.0 63.8 50.9 76.7
BoEaverage 75.0 55.2 59.5 50.0 75.0
seq2vec 73.3 53.8 65.5 65.5 75.0
attention 82.8 57.5 85.3 62.1 82.8
Legal vs. Illegal Onion Drugs
NB 77.6 53.4 87.9 51.7 77.6
SVM 63.8 66.4 63.8 70.7 63.8
BoEsum 52.6 61.2 74.1 50.9 51.7
BoEaverage 57.8 57.8 52.6 55.2 50.9
seq2vec 56.9 55.0 54.3 59.5 49.1
attention 64.7 51.4 62.9 55.2 69.0
Table 3: Test accuracy in percents for each classifier
(rows) in each setting (columns) on drugs-related data.
confirmed by the drop in accuracy when content
words are removed. However, in this setting (drop
cont.), non-trivial performance is still obtained by
the SVM classifier, suggesting that the domains
are distinguishable (albeit to a lesser extent) based
on the function word distribution alone.
Surprisingly, the more sophisticated neural clas-
sifiers perform worse than Naive Bayes. This is
despite using pre-trained word embeddings, and
architectures that have proven beneficial for text
classification. It is likely that this is due to the
small size of the training data, as well as the spe-
cialized vocabulary found in this domain, which
is unlikely to be supported well by the pre-trained
embeddings (see §4.2).
Legal vs. illegal drugs. Classifying legal and
illegal pages within the drugs domain on Onion
proved to be a more difficult task. However, where
content words are replaced with their POS tags,
the SVM classifier distinguishes between legal and
illegal texts with quite a high accuracy (70.7% on a
balanced test set). This suggests that the syntactic
structure is sufficiently different between the do-
mains, so as to make them distinguishable in terms
of their distribution of grammatical categories.
drop drop pos pos
full cont. func cont. func
Legal vs. Illegal Onion Forums
NB 74.1 50.9 78.4 50.9 72.4
SVM 85.3 75.9 56.0 81.9 81.0
BoEsum 25.9 32.8 21.6 36.2 35.3
BoEaverage 40.5 42.2 31.9 48.3 53.4
seq2vec 50.0 48.9 50.9 28.4 51.7
attention 31.0 37.2 33.6 27.6 30.2
Trained on Drugs, Tested on Forums
NB 78.4 63.8 89.7 63.8 79.3
SVM 62.1 69.0 54.3 69.8 62.1
BoEsum 45.7 50.9 49.1 50.9 50.0
BoEaverage 49.1 51.7 51.7 52.6 58.6
seq2vec 51.7 61.1 51.7 54.3 57.8
attention 65.5 59.2 65.5 50.9 66.4
Table 4: Test accuracy in percents for each classifier
(rows) in each setting (columns) on forums data.
6 Illegality Detection Across Domains
To investigate illegality detection across different
domains, we perform classification experiments
on the “forums” category that is also separated
into legal and illegal sub-categories in DUTA-
10K. The forums contain user-written text in vari-
ous topics. Legal forums often discuss web design
and other technical and non-technical activity on
the internet, while illegal ones involve discussions
about cyber-crimes and guides on how to com-
mit them, as well as narcotics, racism and other
criminal activities. As this domain contains user-
generated content, it is more varied and noisy.
6.1 Experimental setup
We use the cleaning process described in Section 3
and data splitting described in Section 5, with the
same number of paragraphs. We experiment with
two settings:
• Training and testing on Onion legal vs. ille-
gal forums, to evaluate whether the insights
observed in the drugs domain generalize to
user-generated content.
• Training on Onion legal vs. illegal drugs-
related pages, and testing on Onion legal vs.
illegal forums. This cross-domain evaluation
reveals whether the distinctions learned on
Legal Onion Illegal Onion
Generic Viagra Oral Jelly is used for Erectile Dys 8/03/2017 - ATTN! Looks like SIGAINT email provid
Fortis Testosteron Testosterone Enanthate 250mgml Medical Grade Cannabis Buds We stock high quality
Generic Cialis is used to treat erection problems 1 BTC 2630.8 USD
2 Kits Misoprostol 200mg with 4 Tablets $75 $150 Cialis(r) is in a class of drugs called Phosphodie
Boldenone 300 New Boldenone 300 Olymp Labs TZOLKIN CALENDAR, 140ug LSD Marquis PreTest
(generic Viagra) unbranded generic Sildenafil citr Formed in early 2016, OzDrugsExpress is the work o
Mesterolone New Mesterolone Olymp Labs 500mg x 30 pills Price:45.95Perpill : 1.53 Ord
manufactured by: Cipla Pharmaceuticals Compare to Generic Kaletra contains a combination of lopinavi
(generic Zoloft) Sertraline 25 mg tablets US$31.05 / roduct-category/cannabis/ Cannabis / 14g Amnesia
Sustanon-250mg Testosterone Compound 250mgml Welcome to SnowKings Good Quality Cocaine[.1cm]
Figure 1: Example paragraphs (data instances) from the training sets of the Legal Onion and Illegal Onion subsets
of the drug-related corpus (ten examples from each). Each paragraph is trimmed to the first 50 characters for space
reasons. Distinguishing lexical features are easily observed, e.g., names of legal and illegal drugs.
Legal Onion Illegal Onion
( ADJ PROPN ) PROPN PROPN VERB NUM 3. We VERB VERB NOUN with ADV the A
( ADJ PROPN , PROPN ) PROPN NUM NOU NOUN . NOUN NOUN PROPN NOUN
PROPN PROPN VERB PROPN NUM NOUN US$ VERB NOUN NOUN : No ADJ than NUM NO
PROPN PROPN PROPN NUM NOUN $ NUM PR Welcome! We VERB ADJ to VERB a ADJ
NOUN NUM PROPN with NOUN - NOUN NUM PROPN PROPN PROPN NOUN : ADJ NOUN V
PROPN NUM PROPN PROPN $ NUM ( PROPN ) NUM PROPN PROPN NUM PROPN
ADJ PROPN NUM PROPN VERB US$ NUM fo NOUN PROPN NUM , NUM ADJ NOUN , ADJ
( ADJ PROPN ) NOUN NUM NOUN NOUN . You VERB ADV VERB NUM of these NOUN
PROPN PROPN PROPN NUM PROPN PROPN - / NOUN - NOUN / NOUN PROPN / PROPN
PROPN / PROPN PROPN PROPN / PROPN P Any NOUN VERB us.
Figure 2: Example paragraphs (data instances) from the training sets of the Legal Onion and Illegal Onion subsets
of the drug-related corpus (ten examples from each), where content words are replaced with their parts of speech.
Each paragraph is trimmed to the first 50 characters for space reasons. Different instances are shown than in
Figure 1. Although harder to identify, distinguishing patterns are observable in this case too.
the drugs domain generalize directly to the
forums domain.
6.2 Results
Accuracy scores are reported in Table 4.
Legal vs. illegal forums. Results when train-
ing and testing on forums data are much worse
for the neural-based systems, probably due to the
much noisier and more varied nature of the data.
However, the SVM model achieves an accuracy
of 85.3% in the full setting. Good performance is
presented by this model even in the cases where
the content words are dropped (drop. cont.) or
replaced by part-of-speech tags (pos cont.), un-
derscoring the distinguishability of legal in illegal
content based on shallow syntactic structure in this
domain as well.
Cross-domain evaluation. Surprisingly, train-
ing on drugs data and evaluating on forums per-
forms much better than in the in-domain setting
for four out of five classifiers. This implies that
while the forums data is noisy, it can be accurately
classified into legal and illegal content when train-
ing on the cleaner drugs data. This also shows that
illegal texts in Tor share common properties re-
gardless of topical category. The much lower re-
sults obtained by the models where content words
are dropped (drop cont.) or converted to POS tags
(pos cont.), namely less than 70% as opposed to
89.7% when function words are dropped, suggest
that some of these properties are lexical.
7 Discussion
As shown in Section 4, the Legal Onion and Il-
legal Onion domains are quite distant in terms of
word distribution and named entity Wikification.
Moreover, named entity recognition and Wikifi-
cation work less well for the illegal domain, and
so do state-of-the-art neural text classification ar-
chitectures (Section 5), which present inferior re-
Legal Onion
feature ratio
cart 0.037
2016 0.063
Bh 0.067
drugs 0.067
EUR 0.077
very 0.083
Per 0.091
delivery 0.091
symptoms 0.091
Please 0.100
Quantity 0.100
here 0.100
check 0.100
contact 0.100
called 0.100
not 0.102
if 0.105
If 0.111
taking 0.111
like 0.111
questions 0.111
Cart 0.118
> 0.125
take 0.125
Illegal Onion
feature ratio
Laboratories 8.500
Cipla 9.000
Pfizer 9.000
each 9.571
Force 10.000
Pharma 10.333
grams 10.333
300 10.500
Bitcoin 11.500
RSM 12.000
Sun 12.000
manufactured 12.667
Tablets 13.000
tablets 13.714
120 16.000
Moldova 17.000
citrate 18.000
Pharmaceuticals 31.500
New 33.000
200 36.000
blister 48.000
generic 49.500
60 55.000
@ 63.000
Table 5: Most indicative features for each class in NB
classifier trained on Onion legal vs. illegal drugs, and
the ratio between their number of occurrences in the
“illegal” class and the “legal” class in the training set.
Left: features with lowest ratio; right: features with
highest ratio. While some strong features are entities,
many are in fact function words.
sults to simple bag-of-words model. This is likely
a result of the different vocabulary and syntax of
text from Onion domain, compared to standard
domains used for training NLP models and pre-
trained word embeddings. This conclusion has
practical implications: to effectively process text
in Onion, considerable domain adaptation should
be performed, and effort should be made to anno-
tate data and extend standard knowledge bases to
cover this idiosyncratic domain.
Another conclusion from the classification ex-
periments is that the Onion Legal and Illegal
Onion texts are harder to distinguish than eBay
and Legal Onion, meaning that deciding on do-
main boundaries should consider syntactic struc-
ture, and not only lexical differences.
Analysis of texts from the datasets. Looking
at specific sentences (Figure 1) reveals that Le-
gal Onion and Illegal Onion are easy to distinguish
based on the identity of certain words, e.g., terms
for legal and illegal drugs, respectively. Thus
looking at the word forms is already a good solu-
tion for tackling this classification problem, which
gives further insight as to why modern text classi-
fication (e.g., neural networks) do not present an
advantage in terms of accuracy.
Analysis of manipulated texts. Given that re-
placing content words with their POS tags sub-
stantially lowers performance for classification of
legal vs illegal drug-related texts (see “pos cont.”
in Section 5), we conclude that the distribution of
parts of speech alone is not as strong a signal as
the word forms for distinguishing between the do-
mains. However, the SVM model does manage to
distinguish between the texts even in this setting.
Indeed, Figure 2 demonstrates that there are eas-
ily identifiable patterns distinguishing between the
domains, but that a bag-of-words approach may
not be sufficiently expressive to identify them.
Analysis of learned feature weights. As the
Naive Bayes classifier was the most successful at
distinguishing legal from illegal texts in the full
setting (without input manipulation), we may con-
clude that the very occurrence of certain words
provides a strong indication that an instance is
taken from one class or the other. Table 5 shows
the most indicative features learned by the Naive
Bayes classifier for the Legal Onion vs. Illegal
Onion classification in this setting. Interestingly,
many strong features are function words, provid-
ing another indication of the different distribution
of function words in the two domains.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we identified several distinguishing
factors between legal and illegal texts, taking a va-
riety of approaches, predictive (text classification),
application-based (named entity Wikification), as
well as an approach based on raw statistics. Our
results revealed that legal and illegal texts on the
Darknet are not only distinguishable in terms of
their words, but also in terms of their shallow syn-
tactic structure, manifested in their POS tag and
function word distributions. Distinguishing fea-
tures between legal and illegal texts are consis-
tent enough between domains, so that a classifier
trained on drug-related websites can be straight-
forwardly ported to classify legal and illegal texts
from another Darknet domain (forums). Our re-
sults also show that in terms of vocabulary, le-
gal texts and illegal texts are as distant from each
other, as from comparable texts from eBay.
We conclude from this investigation that Onion
pages provide an attractive testbed for studying
distinguishing factors between the text of legal and
illegal webpages, as they present challenges to off-
the-shelf NLP tools, but at the same time have suf-
ficient self-consistency to allow studies of the lin-
guistic signals that separate these classes.
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